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CHAPTER 12

THE USE OF SECURITY PROFESSIONALS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

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From Vietnam to Panama, Afghanistan to Iraq, history demonstrates an overwhelming need to provide appropriate security as the primary factor to achieving sustainable stability in the aftermath of conflict. The consequences of not immediately establishing effective security are televised throughout the world and used to the advantage of those elements who find political and economic advantage in the resultant instability. A lack of security encourages lawlessness and plants the seeds of insurgency. Despite history's evidence, the use of law enforcement organizations to prevent or reduce the opportunity for, or the intensity and length of an insurgency has been virtually ignored by U.S. military strategists and planners. Failing to adequately recognize the unique qualities that military and civilian law enforcement or other specialized forces bring to bear on the post-conflict and insurgency environments leads to an overapplication of maneuver-centric approaches when considering the level of force to apply for restoration of security and order among indigenous populations. Such tactics create popular resentment; lessen local, domestic, and international legitimacy of the operations; and risk creating support for the insurgency. In addition, whatever the degree of security that conventional forces have established for the indigenous population is often not sustainable when the combat forces depart. This chapter discusses the lawless environment and the power vacuum frequently created by conflict; shows how this environment can fuel an insurgency; and offers insights for incorporating specialized and police capabilities into future military strategies and counterinsurgency plans.

INSURGENCY

In the emerging 21st century environment, nations with competent armed forces and capable intelligence agencies no longer fear encroachment from their neighbors and can extend security to others. Globalization, treaties, and economic well-being have fostered a relatively stable and peaceful international and domestic environment for most developed nations. The concerns of 21st security are largely about the possible collateral damage from the actions of rogue states, terrorists, and criminal elements who disregard recognized territorial and legal boundaries; and about the chaos and lawlessness of failed and failing states. Inside the borders of the latter, not only do terrorists, criminals, and political opportunists seek advantage, but fragments of the population feel disenfranchised and unjustly treated as their culture, society, and institutions fail. These factors lead to violence and other disruptive acts.¹ Conventional military forces are ill equipped to respond to these phenomena as they spread throughout the populace, particularly in urban areas. Often, despite the best intentions of the actions of a seated government or members of

the international community, or perhaps as a direct result of these actions, an insurgency may take root. It is an emerging reality of the 21st century that insurgency is a preferred form of war “by those who seek to overthrow or force change of a benevolent authority,” and is being pursued largely in urban areas—an environment particular ill-suited for general purpose forces.²

Insurgency is generally defined as “a condition of revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government and is not recognized as belligerency.”³ Recent military doctrine has found a need to further clarify this in light of recent developments of the 21st century by indicating that “an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”⁴ The same doctrine defines counterinsurgency as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”⁵ A recent article defined counterinsurgency even more accurately, “an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.”⁶

Insurgencies thrive particularly well in power vacuums that can typically be found following conflict, the collapse of repressive regimes, or in failing states. Often times in these circumstances perverted social institutions, governments, and political officials have contributed to the chaotic environment through their control of the population through fear and oppression, fostering feelings of mistrust, and through a void of suitable political processes. A disillusioned population is particularly vulnerable during periods of general chaos and is looking for a government that can provide for their basic needs. This period has been referred to as the “golden hour,” implying it is the opportune time to act for forces of good or ill. Security is paramount to creating an environment that meets the people’s expectations. Military strategies and plans too often focus on combating the insurgents instead of preventing the conditions which foster destabilizing trends and enable an insurgency. Establishing security in the short term in order to avert chaos and to prevent criminal and insurgent forces from securing a foothold in society, while concurrently restoring basic services, is vital to facilitating long-term stability. Understanding why insurgencies succeed leads to an understanding of the critical importance of getting security right.

David Galula’s characterization of insurgency, although developed in the 1960s, remains relevant in the 21st century. “An insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order (China, 1927-49; Greece, 1944-50; Indochina, 1945-54; Malaya, 1948-60; Algeria, 1954-62).”⁷ Galula asserts that the object of revolutionary war, or an insurgency, is the population itself. Insurgents are trying to win the population over, and the counterinsurgency is trying to sustain the people’s loyalty to the established regime. It is a struggle over legitimacy and for survival. Galula concludes that these objectives are political in nature, and insurgencies are inherently protracted wars. As Galula observes, “It takes time for a small group of insurgent leaders to organize a revolutionary movement, to raise and develop armed forces, to a balance with the

opponent and to overpower him.”⁸ Studies have shown that insurgencies on the average last 10 years;⁹ these years are marked with continued internal friction caused by violence and instability. Even in the case of well-equipped and trained militaries, it is difficult to sustain public support and international approval of counterinsurgency combat activities for an extended period.

States countering insurgencies at home or abroad must recognize that defeating the insurgency is not just a military problem. As insurgent groups seek to gain legitimacy over the existing government they often and logically promote reforms and social justice for the purpose of persuading the indigenous populace and international political and civil society to support them. Over time, an insurgent group gains a practical and moral legitimacy through the use of such policies.¹⁰ To combat insurgencies, governments and conventional armies must adapt to the challenges posed by the many political, cultural, religious, economic, moral, and social justice issues that enable an insurgency. Successfully confronting these challenges requires an increasingly secure environment.

THE LESSON OF IRAQ

The progress of the war in Iraq clearly reveals the benefits that could have been realized had the strategy and planning efforts included a more comprehensive approach to providing a stable social order following the U.S. invasion. At the end of major combat operations in Iraq, when the U.S. Army’s Third Infantry Division entered the capital city of Baghdad, the Iraqi National Police had been disbanded. They blended into the populace taking with them their weapons, and more importantly, their experience and institutional knowledge of keeping order in a city the size of Baghdad. Initially, arriving U.S. forces were greeted as liberators. Shortly thereafter, U.S. Soldiers witnessed the jubilant crowds transform into rioters and looters.¹¹ Without the control provided by local and national law enforcement agencies – and in the absence of a U.S. security alternative – the populace burned and destroyed government buildings, stole artifacts, and carried out violent acts on citizens believed to be Ba’ath party members, or sympathetic to the former regime.

American Soldiers were exceptionally well-trained and doctrinally prepared to survive and win in the harsh conditions of conventional warfare; but they were ill prepared to conduct community policing, especially in a highly charged religious and ethnically divided environment. U.S. military and civilian leadership did not see law enforcement as a military mission and, like the Soldiers, expected to see law and order prevail. The developing disconnects were complicated because the indigenous culture is rooted in Islam and the Koran. Religion not only played a greater role in political decisions and social expectations than the U.S. decisionmakers and Soldiers grasped, but also defined in part the responsibilities of successful armies and popular expectations. The expectations of both the Americans and the Iraqi citizens were greatly disappointed.

The initial failure of the Soldiers to act, and subsequent belated actions, formed the basis for future relationships; such initial impressions are difficult to overcome, especially when they are negative. In Iraq, U.S. Soldiers who were initially photographed alongside plunderers and lawbreakers, ignoring the looting, rioting, and violence that occurred, quickly found that gaining the confidence of the average Iraqi citizen proved to be extremely difficult.¹² In a United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Robert M. Perito

asserts that “Responsibility for law and order fell to coalition military forces that were neither trained nor equipped to perform police functions. U.S. soldiers complained they had not been trained to fight crime and should not be asked to make arrests.”¹³ The report goes on to conclude that coalition forces developed insensitivity to the violent Iraqi-on-Iraqi crime that was occurring. The negative impact of this indifferent attitude on Iraqi citizens was immeasurable, but clearly evident in the pervading Iraqi attitudes on the streets and in media reports. Since the Iraqi Police Service was unable to protect the Iraqi public and the coalition forces seemed indifferent to the welfare of the Iraqi citizens, the conditions were set for insurgency.¹⁴

The rift between Coalition Forces and the Iraqi people widened further when U.S. decisionmakers began to react to the growing disorder. U.S. and coalition combat soldiers searching Iraqi homes appeared insensitive to common Islamic customs such as not entering a house occupied by women without a Muslim male present. This lack of cultural awareness among Coalition Forces contributed to the negative impression already taking root in the minds of many Iraqi citizens. Cultural awareness in regard to an indigenous population is now accepted as a core principle for providing legitimate security and social order so as to prevent civil disobedience and illegal activities. Cultural awareness and sensitivity to citizens’ expectations is another fundamental principle of professional law enforcement operations.

An integral component of legitimacy for governance is public safety. In Iraq, that responsibility fell initially to the United States and its coalition partners following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. When lawlessness took root, it resembled the symptoms of a virus, spreading from neighborhood to neighborhood, feeding on the weak and disenchanting, young and old alike. Criminal elements seeking to intimidate the populace united, using the powerful weapon of fear. Former regime enforcers used their reputations to victimize the public through further violence and extortion. What was left of the criminal justice system had been disbanded since it was wrought with government supported corruption and no appropriate substitute was provided. Public safety was nowhere to be found.¹⁵ Islamic fundamentalists seeking to expel the infidel Americans from Islamic territory seized the opportunity to spread death and terror among the average citizens. Political opportunists took advantage of the lawlessness to acquire power. Iraqi citizens became vulnerable to anyone with a gun or a bomb strapped to their body – and susceptible to promises of security and social justice. As the golden hour slipped by, insurgency became the unwelcome bridesmaid of any U.S. supported government.

COUNTERING AN INSURGENCY

R. Scott Moore, in *The Basics of Counterinsurgency*, states “The ultimate objective of counterinsurgency strategy is lasting stability, but not one that is imposed and maintained by force or repression. Stability must provide the structures necessary to peacefully address issues that may continue to arise; those structures must be understood, institutionalized, and fully accepted by the population, who now feel they benefit from them.”¹⁶ Moore also points out that “to be successful, counterinsurgencies must be perceived as legitimate . . . legitimacy within the conflict zone occurs when populations, and their leaders,

understand that the counterinsurgency results benefit them more than any alternative.”¹⁷ Hence, from an insurgent’s perspective the government’s legitimacy is a center of gravity, and it can be attacked by creating insecurity for the population.¹⁸

Moore found in his study of insurgencies that only 40 percent of counterinsurgencies were successful, and that for lasting stability, the conflict had to be resolved in all its dimensions—not just overwhelming application of military force.¹⁹ In this strategic approach, he offers six critical tasks to be integrated for success.

1. Establish and Maintain Security: This task is broken into three subcomponents: restoring security; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and maintaining security. It is a broad task that is much more encompassing than military operations. It reestablishes basic public safety and restores the confidence of the populace in the ability of government to assure security in the short run and over time. To gain trust and legitimacy, local public safety agencies and defense forces must be given training, if needed, and the opportunity to work independent of security forces. Restoring credible public safety is manpower-intensive; it requires well-trained personnel acting with situational and cultural awareness.²⁰

2. Provide Humanitarian and Essential Services: This task entails rebuilding the critical infrastructure, including public transportation, utilities, communication, medical aid, and other basic quality of life services. When properly integrated, it minimizes the helplessness of the civilian population and takes the edge off the destructive effect of military operations. Hence, it enhances the effectiveness of security forces. It is often the first step in establishing political and economic development.²¹

3. Promote Effective Governance: Confidence in government from the local to the national level is required, and its consideration must be integrated into all tasks. The populace must feel that their political leadership has their interest at heart, and not that of some special group or occupying force. Effective governments create a binding social contract in which the government creates the conditions to meet basic social needs, and the citizens willingly give their allegiance and support. Such governments are not installed and need not be propped up, but earn legitimacy through serving their people’s best interests.²² The rule of law they establish supports the achievement of the other tasks.

4. Sustain Economic Development: A broken economy is often the underlying reason that ignites an insurgency. On the other hand, a strong and sustained economy helps build and maintain stability, effective governance, and long-term prosperity. Security forces are essential to creating conditions for economic development, from creating a safe environment in which to conduct day-to-day business, to augmenting the efforts of other internal and external agencies. Economic development supports the creation of jobs and normalcy. It can also falter because of fraud, corruption, and incompetence—potentially contributing to the legitimacy of an insurgency.²³

5. Support Reconciliation: To end an insurgency, the underlying issues must be addressed and the reconciliation to reunite the population must occur, or civil order will be disrupted by continued mistrust and violence. Without reconciliation, progress in all other tasks is at risk. All parties involved in the conflict, including outside forces, must agree on how the peace or cessation of violence will be accomplished. In addition, the means to mediate local disputes, address war crimes and atrocities, and account for or resettle missing and displaced persons must be resolved. Such justice is an important

component for starting the healing process and for transitioning to sustained security and progress.²⁴

6. Foster Social Change: Successful counterinsurgencies ultimately bring about political and social change. Insurgencies result from political, economic, and social weaknesses: counterinsurgencies that attempt to maintain the status quo rarely succeed. To achieve lasting stability, pre-existing conditions and attitudes must be altered. However, it does not logically follow that a democratic government should be immediately installed.²⁵ Appropriate social change should be integrated into all the tasks.

What the U.S. policymakers and military strategists failed to grasp in Iraq was the importance of social institutions and their impact on the fabric of public opinion. As a society emerges from conflict, it naturally looks for beneficial change and well-being. It searches for a group to provide basic security and services. Provision of services, not legitimacy, is the primary objective – but legitimacy in large part is achieved through the provision of services. A populace searching for a new stability often finds these services met by rogue elements who are seeking to gain their own legitimacy by providing for basic needs – security, shelter, food, medical aid, and economic opportunities. It matters little that the insurgents may promote instability or use intimidation. Consequently, the struggle for the population's approval becomes a war of a slightly different nature, where the battle for the hearts and minds of the citizens is less about ideology than about social accomplishments on the ground. The ideology is justified by its accomplishments. The victor in this competition gains public trust and confidence, setting the path for a nation's future political, economic, and social development. In this struggle, security is essential and must be integrated with the other tasks. Not surprisingly, the ways and means of how security is attained and sustained is paramount.²⁶

COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

Countering an insurgency requires forces and resources to integrate and accomplish the tasks outlined above. Roles, missions, and responsibilities should be clearly stated and understood by all internal and external actors participating in the effort. Since security provides the basic foundation on which additional institutions and infrastructure are built, it is essential to get security *right* early in the process. Getting security right from the start enables the government emerging from or engaged in the conflict to take advantage of the golden hour and capitalize on the population's desire for social stability and opportunity. Getting it wrong, or getting it late, creates opportunities for insurgents, criminals, and political opportunists.

What force capabilities U.S. strategists and planners should propose to address the security requirements and the integrative nature of post-conflict operations and counterinsurgencies is an open question, but one that Iraq and Afghanistan brought to the forefront. Both suggest that conventional military forces are not necessarily the best tool to achieve long-term success in this area.

Counterinsurgency theorist David Galula states that, "conventional warfare has been thoroughly analyzed in the course of centuries—indeed for almost the extent of recorded history—and the process of battle has been sliced into distinct phases: march

towards the enemy, test of the enemy's strength, exploitation of success, eventual retreat, etc."²⁷ Galula's argument is that in training for conventional warfare, soldiers are not challenged to deal with the issues that are characteristics of an insurgency. He asserts that "in counterinsurgency warfare, the soldier's job is to help win the support of the population, and in so doing, has to engage in practical politics."²⁸ Moore's codification of the six integrative tasks supports this assertion. The bravery and positive achievements of conventional forces notwithstanding, there are special skills and considerations that have proven effective in the past for countering the security issues of insurgencies. Past successes more often came at the hands of civilian and more specialized military organizations, as opposed to general purpose military forces. While military civil affairs and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) capabilities have been generally advocated and scrutinized, three other U.S. means need greater consideration.

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

In the United States, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, elite military units trained and equipped for special missions normally not part of the general purpose force mission set. While SOF units and personnel are assigned around the world, all special operations personnel, units, and Title 10 responsibilities fall under U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), one of the unified commands. USSOCOM was formed at the initiative of the U.S. Congress to ensure SOF retained its unique nature and capabilities. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy, specialized training, and use specialized equipment. For many, cultural awareness and immersion are inherent to their qualifications. SOF units total roughly 34,000 active and 15,000 reserve personnel in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, or about 2 percent of all U.S. active and reserve forces.²⁹

Special operations units conduct direct or indirect military missions focused on strategic or operational objectives in support of U.S. policy and strategy. These missions exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces and include unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense which bear directly on counterinsurgency capabilities, focusing on training and assistance for indigenous government agencies trying to overcome subversion and hostile internal activities.³⁰ U.S. special operations in the Philippines illustrate the capabilities and potential of these forces in the prospective or actual counterinsurgency environment.

The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) was created in July 2002 by the Special Operations Command Pacific. It operates "by, through and with" its Philippine Armed Forces counterparts in humanitarian, civic actions, and military advisory missions that span Moore's six tasks.³¹ What security should look like in this particular environment was an inherent advisory task. As part of the military advisory role, it deployed in Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) alongside Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) soldiers conducting counterinsurgency operations. The LCE teams and the AFP exchanged subject matter experts and conducted civil affairs projects and psychological operations. The object of the coalition operation was to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which had been terrorizing the Philippine people for almost 20 years³²

Through the use of civil-military assistance programs, the LCE and the AFP have constructed and repaired roads, built schools and hospitals, and established water drilling sites in an effort to improve the daily lives of the civilian populace. The AFP credits these projects with helping to separate the population from the terrorist organizations. Because of the exchange of medical subject matter expertise, a quarter of million patients have been treated by AFP personnel and LCE teams since 2002. A Commander of JSOTF-P, Colonel David Maxwell, reported that “in addition to these projects, military and information operations have created a paradigm shift within the community, denying sanctuary for terrorist elements and leaders.”³³ The use of psychological operations is also having a measured effect. The PSYOP Reward for Justice Program has paid out over \$10 million for information to AFP concerning the activities and location of terrorists. This information led to the neutralization of two key Abu Sayyaf Group leaders. A deputy commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command noted that “Our operation has a Philippine face on them. The people in the local areas are crediting the Philippine government for the goodness that is coming from the activity.”³⁴ The Philippine government is winning the hearts and minds of the people and the Special Operations Forces are assisting in legitimizing the government through the use of the LCE teams, who traditionally have the mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations in theater.³⁵

Unfortunately, the amount of training and resources required to create these special operations forces make them a valuable, yet scarce, resource. However, the success of the counterinsurgency efforts in the Philippines not only highlights the need for additional forces: it also demonstrates how integrating the six tasks in an unstable environment—even if a long term one—can establish government legitimacy through effective services.

THE U.S. MILITARY POLICE

U.S. military police, though not a special operations force, possess unique training and capabilities indispensable to meeting the challenges of establishing security in post-conflict environments and undermining insurgent tactics. Their training and competencies serve five basic operations: police intelligence; law and order; internment; resettlement operations; and maneuver, mobility and survivability.³⁶ Obviously, as part of the conventional force structure, military police have an important role on the traditional battlefield, but a part of that role is equally suitable to the post-conflict or insurgency setting. In this regard, these special capabilities contribute to restoring and maintaining public order and thereby enabling the government to create security and stability, which ultimately fosters trust and confidence in the populace.

U.S. military police are flexible and capable of transcending their strictly military role to provide the particular services required in emergency situations such as disaster relief, emergency evacuation, civil crisis, peace operations, and post-conflict operations. Like civilian law enforcement officers, military police are adept at community policing.³⁷ They are comfortable interacting with civilians in both domestic and international settings. Again, as with their civilian counterparts, the presence of effective military police operations creates an impression of a disciplined order and has a calming effect on distraught citizens. Such was the case with the peacekeeping and stabilization operations recently conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo, where U.S. military police joined

in cooperative efforts with the UN to develop community policing initiatives with local police agencies. With over 52 percent of the military police force structure residing in the Reserve Components, and a significant number holding civilian law enforcement jobs, an added benefit for the United States is that many of these Soldiers bring their civilian policing skills and experience to the military mission.

U.S. military police are part of the conventional force structure and have clear missions as part of the general purpose forces. Yet, their unique capabilities provide significant advantages for creating and sustaining a secure environment in post-conflict or insurgency environments. These advantages extend beyond the conduct of operations in their areas of expertise, to advising and training indigenous civil and military police, and perhaps training general purpose forces serving in such environments as well. Their applicability to the emerging 21st century security environment is so profound that it rebegs the question of how much force structure should be allocated for military police.

U.S. CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Post-conflict insecurity and the potential for a successful insurgency can also be reduced through the effective use civilian law enforcement capabilities. A recent RAND Corporation Study commissioned by the U.S. Army War College identifies these capabilities as Special Police Units (SPU) and Transitional Law Enforcement (TLE). In regard to the latter, the transitional period is the time during which the control of security is passed to the indigenous government. It can refer to post-combat operations or the time when some lesser form of intervention winds down. Several U.S. federal agencies have law enforcement personnel that can potentially deploy to and operate on foreign soil. These agencies, in cooperation with other international law enforcement activities, can provide the following capabilities: (1) high-end qualifications to deal with organized entities such as criminals or insurgents; (2) intelligence and criminal investigation; (3) control of crowds and unruly populations; and (4) training of indigenous law enforcement.³⁸

The U.S. Marshal Service (USMS) is one example of a U.S. federal agency with excellent transitional law enforcement credentials. All four of the capabilities identified above are found within its wide range of police specialties and organizational structure. Its historical legal authority to deputize nonfederal law enforcement personnel allows it to bring in large numbers of other law enforcement resources under the same legal protection enjoyed by federal marshals.³⁹ In addition, under the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) program have the mandate and key capabilities to reestablish and support the rule of law globally. For example, ICITAP provides law enforcement training worldwide at all levels of the criminal justice system in a comprehensive manner. It does this through the employment of a large number of contract personnel who supplement a fairly austere full-time ICITAP staff at the DoJ. This training can be custom-made to fit the host nation requirements.⁴⁰

Of course, ICITAP training is derived from the perspective of law enforcement in a democratic society, linking services and legitimacy back to democratic government in support of U.S. long-term interests. ICITAP is currently conducting law enforcement training in 17 countries of which Albania, East Timor, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Kosovo

are representative. In Kosovo, police trained by the ICITAP are deployed throughout the newly declared independent state.⁴¹ In partnership with ICITAP, OPDAT provides training to support the upper tier of a national criminal justice system, the judicial system. It trains prosecutors and judges in order to negate the power of intimidation used against public officials and business leaders to subvert justice.⁴²

Any discussion of the use of U.S. personnel for purposes of conducting, training, or advising police in a foreign government must include reference to Title 22 restrictions. Generally, Section 2420 of the Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits use of U.S. funding to support external activities of this nature. However, as is often the case with prohibitions, exceptions are cited in the U.S. Code. Specifically, funding for such activities are allowed in accordance with subparagraph (b): "with respect to assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purpose of supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provisions of professional public safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human rights."⁴³ This exclusion is critical for any reconstruction program in Iraq or Afghanistan. Equally critical, U.S. strategists and planners must recognize that in taking the necessary steps for successful nation-building, the use of civil law enforcement expertise offers one more way to counter any potential rift between the indigenous population and combat troops. The desired effects are achieved less violently and more effectively through a more precise application of specialized military and law enforcement capabilities.

CONCLUSION

Mistakes were made by U.S. policymakers, strategists, and planners in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither effort shows an appropriate appreciation of the proper role of security and its integrative relationship with the other critical tasks highlighted by Moore's and Galula's studies of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The decision by U.S. and coalition partners to disband the Iraqi public safety institutions without a practical replacement proved harmful to the Iraqi population and coalition forces alike, greatly complicating the establishment of a legitimate government and costing many lives. Notwithstanding the decisions of policymakers, the military grossly underestimated the importance of basic security and services in post-conflict and nation-building. The liberation cast average Iraqis into far worse social conditions than they had experienced under Saddam and created opportunities for criminals and political opportunists of all types. Once these forces were unleashed, post-conflict operations took on the attributes of an insurgency. Untrained and unprepared conventional U.S. forces compounded the situation by their reliance on traditional combat power. A parallel exists in Afghanistan where apparent initial success was lost to resurgent Taliban forces resulting from the failure to grasp the integrative nature of Moore's six critical tasks. Crossing the thin line between partner and occupier could have been avoided had the United States better understood and applied Moore's six basic steps, and had the military strategists and planners grasped the relationship between post-conflict operations and insurgency.

Equally important, 21st century warfare will be triggered by policy driven belligerents who avoid conventional warfare and seek to overthrow governments through violence —

insurgencies. Then Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus grasped these emerging truths in a *Military Review* essay where he stated:

The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are fighting and they clearly are the wars we must master. America's overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strength—firepower, maneuver technology—and come at us and our partners the way the insurgents do in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative, therefore, that we continue to learn from our experiences in those countries, both to succeed in those endeavors and to prepare for the future.⁴⁴

Whether emerging from post-conflict situations, self-started by political opportunists, or arising from conditions in failed and failing states, insurgency is on the rise and counterinsurgency success rests on a foundation of security.

Conventional military forces are seldom able to defeat insurgencies using military means alone. Even if they could, the costs in local, international, and domestic legitimacy for applying the levels of force required might be strategically prohibitive. Hence, avoiding or curtailing instability by providing, creating, and supporting appropriate indigenous security institutions, public security becomes more paramount. Such security may be imposed to some level by general purpose forces, but it is better provided by military and civilian organizations and personnel who have particular security expertise. As with the other counterinsurgency tasks, the peculiar expertise enhances the performance of the task by virtue of training and experience because its less or noncombative nature enhances and transfers the legitimacy of the actions to the host government. In both post-conflict operations and insurgencies, military strategists and planners should make better use of SOF, military policy, and civil law enforcement capacity. This emerging truth has force structure and resource implications across the whole of government, but it leverages the golden hour and lessens costs in blood and treasure as the United States pursues its national interests in a 21st century world order.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

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